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Abstract:  
This study has a major motivation to empirically find the fundamentals of budget deficit 
instability for the period 1984 to 2016 using panel data for South Asia and ASEAN countries. 
As main determinants the study has considered the role of institutions, governance variables 
like corruption, political instability, military in politics and conflicts.  
 
The economic data is collected from international financial statistics and world development 
indicators. The data on political variables are collected from International Country Risk 
Data Guide (ICRG). Panel data models like Fixed Effect and Random Effect Model are used 
to test the volatility of budget deficit.  
 
To make a comparison between results of panel data models and time series analysis this 
study also makes an arrangement analysing individual countries, using time series data. The 
results of panel data models and time series models of individual countries both confirm that 
corruption and political stability are important indicators of budget deficit.  
 
To avoid high and unstable deficit attention should be diverted to improve the institutional 
setup of the economy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent years the degree of government budget deficits and debt became the most 
prominent issues in economics on which a lot of discussions are made. Instable 
fiscal deficits may be damaging to social welfare because past literature has widely 
shown that fiscal debt is negatively associated with the long run fiscal balance of the 
economy so future generation may suffer very easily (Alesina and Perotti, 1996; 
Woo, 1996; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994 and Persson and Tabellini, 1994). Central 
bank is deficient in independence and as inflation and budget deficit are closely 
related, so persistent budget deficit may also raise inflation (Fata and Mihov, 2010). 
A lot of efforts are required to recognize the determinants of the large public deficits 
although many researchers have tried but still needs more contribution in this 
context.  
 
In the past budget deficits were considered only as an economic issue but beginning 
of political economics in 1980s gave a realization to researchers to observe this 
subject both from viewpoints of economic and political perspective. After the first 
oil crisis in 1973 many industrialized countries had been facing the problem of 
significant high budget deficits and interesting is the fact even in the prosperous 
years countries were facing problem of budget deficit when there was high growth 
of income whereas according to the economic theory the deficits should be low 
during the time when there is high economic growth.  
 
As a result, in the times of high economic growth the magnitude of debt have been 
accumulated progressively, and more interesting  is the fact, even countries are 
facing similar economic shocks, the amount of  deficits and debt varying in 
magnitude as vary the number of country (Thalassinos et al., 2015a; 2015b; Ugurlu 
et al., 2014). The current economic philosophy alone may not be considered enough 
and satisfactory in order to explain the differences for deficits and debt levels for 
different countries, Therefore, political variables, such as the political stability, 
corruption, law and order, and conflicts may be included as variables in models in 
order to give possible explanations for the varying levels of deficits (Woo, 2003; 
Fatas and Mihov, 2010). 
 
The developed and developing countries have a key challenge of persistently 
increasing budget deficits and its volatility for numerous reasons. First, huge deficit 
instability is a failure of fiscal policy because it becomes impossible to suggest at 
what time and degree of fiscal policy be implement and this leads to become 
decision making inefficient. Second, government spending volatility may be a 
consequence of the budget deficit instability and the distortions in the form of 
wasteful spending made by short-term methods to encounter these variations in 
expenditure. The excellence and competence of the government services for example 
health or education may also be low if government spending volatility depends on 
fiscal deficit volatility. Third, high budget deficit volatility may also be a reason for 
capital loss in the form of short term investment projects. High deficit volatility may 
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also be a reason for high volatility of interest rates which may directly affect 
investment projects because it signifies a monetary load for investments. Chen et al. 
(2016) has shown that there must be an optimal level of public investment and 
government debt. According to this study after a maximum level there will be no 
effect of government debt and investment effect on economic growth. Over the last 
three decades, models which  explains public deficits and its hazards and solution to 
solve the hazards has extensively realized attention; however, models which explain 
public deficit instability is somewhat  a novel subject to be discussed. 
 
The key emphasis of the current study is to empirically examine the foundations of 
deficit volatility for South Asia and ASEAN countries using panel data for the 
period 1984 to 2016. The present study is focusing on the economic political and 
institutional factors that cause instability in budget deficits. The current study also 
draws attention of the economists towards effects of trade openness and inflation on 
budget deficit instability. The analysis includes the impact of political instability on 
the budget deficit instability. The current study is focusing on the political variables 
like corruption, political instability, military in politics and conflicts. The countries 
like Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka are included as south Asia countries 
whereas countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, china, Philippines are 
included as ASEAN countries. The reason for selection is the common features of 
huge unstable public deficit. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Over the last thirty years majority of developed and developing countries are facing 
persistence rise of fiscal deficits.  Many countries are facing a major challenge in the 
form of damages of high fiscal deficit and its volatility (Pontoh, 2017). The subject 
of budget deficit and its determinants is widely theoretically and empirically studied 
(Allegret et al., 2016; Boldeanu and Tache, 2016). Nevertheless, a lot of efforts still 
required in the area of instability of budget deficit. The current section analyses few 
significant studies on this subject of interest. 
 
The topic of budget instability is very broad because the literature can be considered 
according to various political variables. In the recent times the description of 
particular political explanatory variables e.g. political stability, size of government, 
fragmentation of government, type of budgetary procedures, negotiation power of 
unions etc., has received substantial consideration (Roubini and Sachs, 1989; De 
Haan and Sturm, 1994). The budget deficit and surpluses may help to minimize 
spending and revenue shock if tax rate is constant over time Barro (1979) and Lucas 
and Stokey (1983). However, these models are unable to explain reason for the rise 
in oil prices following the oil crises in the 1970s. These models are also unsuccessful 
to provide the answer why varying levels of fiscal deficits are faced by countries 
experienced similar economic shocks. Alesina and Perotti (1995 and 1996b) discuss 
that it is not possible to understand the issue of budget deficit instability without 
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inclusion of the perspective of political and institutional variables because economic 
theory alone is unsuccessful to resolve this issue (Duguleana and Duguleana, 2016). 
 
The association of political variables and fiscal response found in Person (2001) and 
Person and Tabellin (2001). The evidence is also found for low anti cyclical fiscal 
policy in electoral years in Hallerberg and Strauch (2002) and Sorensen et al. 
(2001). Few studies shown that the government with the pro-cyclical polices has 
instable output Lane (2003). Strict budgetary constraint has lower fiscal policy 
volatility Fatas and Mihov (2003 and 2006). In developing countries pro-cyclical 
fiscal policy may explain higher corruption level Alesina and Tabellini (2008).  
 
Discretionary fiscal policy is negatively associated with Government size and 
income Afonso et al. (2008). According to previous works debt is the consequence 
of a fight between different groups of a population who try to take undue possession 
of wealth and capital. The debt is a consequence of a group who take advantage of 
their temporary powers of government. Debt may be used as a tool to redistribute 
incomes to future generations Cukierman and Meltzer (1989) and Song et al. (2014). 
Few studies discuss that the accumulation of debt bound future governments to 
choose their own choices Persson and Svensson (1989), Alesina and Tabellini 
(1990), and Tabellini and Alesina (1990). Natvik (2013) also provide evidence for 
the effect of political system on public savings and investment. Mainly related the 
studies of Tabellini and Alesina (1990), who claim that turnover rate stimulates 
excess deficits, and Glazer (1989), who claims that expected turn over motivates 
excess investment as incumbents attempt to constrain their successors. 
 
Governments determine both debt and future entitlements Bouton et al. (2017) while 
Alesina and Drazen (1989) highlight that political fragmentation is a reason of high 
cost and delayed fiscal implementation of rules. Tabellini and Alesina (1990) show 
that parties have excessive spending if they risk losing the elections. Lizzeri (1999) 
also describes that competition of political party results in fiscal deficit. Azzimonti 
et al. (2015) have given a recent analysis of legal methods to handle unnecessary 
deficits constructed on the dynamic judicial bargaining model in Battaglini and 
Coate (2008). Azzimonti et al. (2015) claim that short run costs and long run 
benefits are associated with balanced budget rule and it may offset costs of fiscal 
deficit. According to economists remarkably high fiscal deficits are permissible only 
if are supported by a parliament Supermajority. The same argument is also 
supported by Becker et al. (2010). Gruner (2017) also  paid attention on public 
expenditure decisions of fiscal policymakers and on political parties bargain for 
budget. 
  
Persson and Tabellini (1999) found that more redistribution and larger governments 
are associated with majoritarian elections whereas presidential governments are less 
redistributive and small. In presidential systems decisions are more clear and self-
governing (Shugart and Carey, 1992). So economic policy can be implemented 
without any rescheduling or interference. On the contrary the parliamentary system 
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is opposite to this because it depends on the electoral laws. Alesina and Perotti 
(1995) and Persson and Tabellini(1997) discover that very few occurrences of large 
fiscal deficit are found in majoritarian and presidential electoral systems rather than 
with proportional governments. More occurrence of fiscal deficit are found in 
countries where is frequent government turnovers, and in the countries where budget 
process is lenient.  Henisz (2004) suggests that formal checks and balance may 
recover economic outcomes. Woo (2003) highlights the political factors, social 
polarization and institutional factors. Leachman et al. (2007) demonstrates that if 
budget imposing institutions are strong fiscal performance may be better. In the 
existing literature on the relationship between income inequality and fiscal deficit 
limited empirical evidence is found. First econometric evidence is provided by Woo 
(1999) that income inequality is an important factor of fiscal deficits. Alesina and 
Perotti (1996a) provide evidence that political instability has positive relation with 
income inequality. Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) 
propose that unequal income distribution with democratic country may inclined to 
go in favor of large redistributive spending. Woo (1999) designed a model to show 
that large deficits are a consequence of a greater incentives to policy makers to 
maintain higher spending to the sectors of their choice.  
   
Roubini and Sachs (1989a and 1989b) gave a stress to association between fiscal 
deficit and the fragmentation with positive relationship. Edin and Ohlsson (1994) 
disclose that this conclusion provided by Roubini and Sachs (1989a and 1989b) may 
be a consequence of  classification and measurement of the variable because it 
captures government fragmentation. Edin and Ohlsson (1994) claims that only 
minority governments has more trend to grow huge deficits. De Haan and Sturm 
(1994) conclude that there are no significant differences  among  different types 
governments. Edin and Ohlsson(1991) and Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) claim 
that minority governments are related with greater deficits. More fiscal deficit in   
minority governments are just because of coordination failure as more members take 
part in the decision making process. Nordhaus (1975), Rogoff and Sibert (1988), 
Rogoff (1990) among others gave evidence that before elections all politicians 
follow expansionary fiscal policy.  Alt and Lassen (2006) discuss that if political 
system is transparent politicians cannot take undue benefit and make fool of general 
public.  
 
Franzese (2002) has discussed that political representatives only go for policies 
which gave advantage to win the following elections. Governmental cycles in 
election years which rely on these policies normally display greater fiscal deficits. 
Mink and De Haan (2005) discover that deficits incline to be higher during election 
years, whereas in the previous year they are not. On the other hand, Andrikopoulos 
et al. (2004) explore that during elections right wing government pay focus to fiscal 
stabilization. Alesina and Roubini (1997) found no evidence of higher deficit for left 
wing government. The collected works on the current issue suggests that more 
efforts are required to find out the sources of instability of budget deficit so it is 
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better to resolve the issue if focus not only on economic variables but also to see the 
reality from political perspective. 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
 
The current study start analysis by application of panel data models on equation 1 
presented below. The data covers up to 33 years of observation ranging from 1984 to 
2016 for South Asia and ASEAN countries and the panel is unbalanced for 
estimation of budget deficit volatility. The current study is based on the theoretical 
work of Alesina and Perotti (1995) and Person and Tabellini (1997) and empirical 
work of Woo (2003) and Henisz (2004). These studies paid attention to the part of 
institutions which is important for proficient economic activity. 
 
The current study is focusing not only on the economic variables for deficit 
instability but also focusing on the political determinants of budget deficit volatility. 
For the South Asia and ASEAN countries the study is using dynamic panel data 
models for the period 1984 to 2016. The empirical specification in dynamic panel 
data models to identify the features defining the instability of budget deficit is 
specified below: 
 
itiititititit vCINSTECONBDVBDV i  +++++= −1                                    (1) 
 
In the above equation volatility of budget deficit for the country i for the period t is 
denoted by BDV, economic variables are denoted by ECONit , political and 
institutional variables are denoted by  INSTit ,and  control variables which record 
country special features Cit .  
 
The economic variables for the current study includes budget deficit which is used 
as a percentage of GDP, trade openness, per capita real GDP and inflation. The 
reason for the selection of real GDP per capita is to record the varying level of 
economic development among the countries. There are few studies which supports a 
negative relationship of budge deficit with real GDP per capita, and reason for this 
negative relationship may be the instable business cycles and inefficient economic 
institutions (Fatas and Mohov, 2006) and rely on discretionary fiscal policy (Rand 
and Tarp, 2002).  
 
Nevertheless, the evidence of positive relationship between per capita GDP and 
budget deficit is also found in few studies. These studies provide the reason that high 
economic growth produces more resources and wealth and high economic growth 
provides solution of socio-economic issues in a better way (Woo, 2003). The reason 
for inclusion of inflation is that to capture its effect because the higher nominal 
interest and the level of economic uncertainty is the consequence of inflation. 
Economic uncertainty and volatility of budget deficit are closely related because this 
may leads to instability in government spending and income and this instability 
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supplements by affecting the volatility of budget deficit. Therefore, it is anticipated a 
positive connection between budget deficit instability and higher inflation. The 
effect of exterior shocks is recorded by the degree of openness. In developing 
countries external shocks may be a reason of fiscal instability. The trade openness is 
calculated an exports plus imports ratio to GDP. It is anticipated that trade openness 
has positive association with budget deficit instability of the country. For example 
Wang et al. (2011), shown that trade openness is one more significant determinant 
of the entire value of houses sold, and this study has captured the effect by using net 
exports and foreign direct investment. It is expected that as the level of openness 
increases, the demand for real estate will increase as well, and further will increase 
housing. The population growth controls for the size of country effects and 
anticipated have a negative association to budget deficit volatility. If a country has 
large population it means an availability of a large group who pay taxes to 
government to easily finance its expenditures. This may be due to the benefits of 
increasing return to scales consequently the government can provide more goods and 
services to the public and this leads to less budget deficit instability. The explanatory 
variables that measure the effect of political instability are included as political 
stability, military in politics, corruption and external conflicts.  
 
In the earlier literature there are numerous readings which describe the instability of 
budget deficit. The three separate panel data econometric methods are used by 
current study to fill the gap of the earlier literature. The Current study is carried out 
for the South Asia and ASEAN countries for the period 1984 to 2016 using the 
Fixed Effect and Random Effect Model. Finally to make a choice between fixed 
effects and random effects approach Hausman test is applied. The general 
econometric representation of the equation for the inclusion of theoretical variables 
is as follows: 
 
 
 
In the above equation volatility of budget deficit is shown by BDV. In this equation i 
represent country and time period denoted by t, as this is a panel data study. The 
Economic variables are denoted by ECONit. The political and institutional variables 
are denoted by INSTit  and finally control variables which record country special 
features are denoted by Cit. 
 
The estimators of fixed effects are also identified as the estimator of least-squares 
dummy variables (LSDV). In this model each group comprises a separate dummy 
variable to have different constants for each group. A fixed effects model may be 
arrange as follows to combine effects which are particular to a country: 
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In the above equation:   is a country effects depending on time. There is another 
method to estimate the model namely random effects model. Random effect method 
holds the constants for each unit not as fixed but random parameter and this is the 
major differentiation of the two models.  
 
3.1. Hausman Test for Model Specification (Fixed Effects vs. Random Effects) 
 
The current study has used Hausman test to conclude which model is best fit for the 
current study whether fixed effect or random effect. If estimators are correlated with 
individual effect still in this situation the advantage of the use of fixed effect 
estimator is it is consistent. The following test statistic is used by the Hausman test: 
 
 
 
If the value of the hausman test statistic is small and the difference between the 
estimates is insignificant we may reject null hypothesis that random effect model is 
consistent and will use the fixed effect model. Contrary to this, large value of the 
Hausman statistics suggests that the random effects models are more suitable. 
 
3.2. Unit Root test and Ordinary Least Square Estimates  
 
To make sure the determinants of budget deficit and to make a comparison between 
results of panel data and time series analysis this study also makes an arrangement to 
study the source of budget deficit for individual country using time series data. So, 
to investigate the stationarity of the basic model is the first step in this regard by the 
usage of unit root test for four countries namely: Indonesia, Thailand, Pakistan and 
India. The availability of data set determines the selection of countries for the period 
1984 to 2016. We reject the null hypothesis of a unit root test if the critical value is 
greater than the ADF test statistic and we conclude that the series is stationary. 
 
For a determination of unit root test the data must be first differenced, second 
differenced and so on until the stationarity is achieved. The Dickey Fuller approach 
(1979) can be considered as an appropriate and simple technique to test order of 
integration of the model. However, it has one drawback that it does not take into 
account the possibility of autocorrelation in the error process εt so Dicky Fuller test 
may not be considered suitable. So, to reduce this problem, the Augmented Dickey- 
Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1981) simply solves this problem. This study 
has chosen four countries namely, Indonesia, Thailand, Pakistan and India for 
application Of Ordinary Least Square estimates using time series data depending 
upon availability of data set from 1984 to 2016.  
 
3.3. Data and Sample 
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The current study has collected data not only for economic variables but also for the 
political variables using panel data from 1984 to 2016. Economic variables are 
obtained through international financial statistics (IFS) and world development 
Indicators (WDI). The source of political variables is International Country Risk 
Data Guide (ICRG). 
 
The current study is using several economic variables like ratio of budget deficit to 
GDP, real GDP per capita, Trade openness and inflation. The reason behind to 
include inflation variable is to confirm the expected positive relationship between 
budget deficit and inflation. The ratio of trade to GDP represents trade openness and 
it captures the external shocks. The population growth is used as a control variable 
to capture the effect of country size of each country. 
 
The political variables such as government/Political stability, external conflict, 
corruption, and military in politics are included to find out the impact of 
governmental uncertainty on budget deficit volatility. This study is using political 
index and it is provided by International country Risk Data Guide. Each political risk 
point is shown by a number assigned by this index. The maximum no of points is 
assigned after assessment of overall risk and the minimum no of point is zero. In this 
index lower total risk is shown by high risk point and higher total risk is shown by 
lower risk point. 
 
4. Empirical results and discussion 
 
This study has tried to explore the determinants of budget deficit volatility by 
application of panel data models. For the present analysis Fixed and random effect 
models are applied and Finally Hausman test is applied to conclude which model is 
best fit for the current study from the two approaches. The current study is designed 
for south Asia and ASEAN region for 1986 to 2016 to confirm the determinants of 
budget deficit. 
 
The estimates of fixed and random effect is shown in Table 1. The equation of fixed 
effect model explain that all variables has expected signs but effect of military in 
politics and external conflicts are not significant for South Asia and ASEAN region. 
According to Table 1 budget deficit is positively and significantly associated with 
inflation and real GDP per capita. Wu et al. (2015) has shown that budget deficit has 
positive effect on land prices. The countries with the higher level of income have 
more variation in budget deficit this may be the reason of positive association 
between the two variables. This may be due to the developmental projects of the 
country as it needs more funds to finance and few studies in past has also shown the 
same relationship, Fatas and Mihov (2006 and 2010) and Woo (2003). The result 
shows that the budget volatility and population growth has a negative relationship. 
This may be due to the welfares effect of increasing return to scales. It is possible for 
the government to make available more welfare projects without affecting budget 
deficit if there is a large pool of tax payers as the population growth increases.  
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The results of fixed effect model show that trade openness have insignificant 
positive association with budget deficit. In developing countries external shocks may 
be a reason of fiscal instability. Variations in export and import prices can affect 
budget deficit through exports profits or import tariffs. Positive association of trade 
openness with budget deficit is also shown by Agnello and Sausa (2009) and Fatas 
and Mahov (2010). It has been proved that effectiveness of fiscal policy depends on 
the efficient political setup (Alesina and Perotti, 1995) and this is proved by 
empirical evidence provided by different studies (Woo, 2003; Alesina and Parotti, 
1996; Fatas and Mihov, 2003).  In this analysis to record the impact of political and 
institutional variables, political stability and corruption are included and these are 
significantly and with budget deficit these are positively associated as shown in 
Table 1. Military in politics and conflicts has also expected sign but their effect is 
not significant. The results of random effect model illustrated that budget deficit do 
not bear an expected sign for inflation, corruption and military in Politics for a given 
set of countries. The Hausman test is presented in Table 2 to compare the results of 
fixed effect with the random effect. The fixed effect model is the best fit model for 
the current study as shown by the P value = 0.00. Hausman test statistic is very small 
so we can conclude the difference between the estimates is insignificant and use 
fixed effect model and reject the null hypothesis which represents consistency of 
random effect model. 
 
Table 1. Fixed Effect and random effect of South Asian and ASEAN countries 
Dependent Variable   
Variables Fixed Effect Random Effect 
C 0.129234* 
(3.64) 
0.105746* 
(5.76) 
Gdp per capita 3.14E-09* 
(6.37) 
3.81E-10 
(1.17) 
Population -0.056845* 
(-5.80) 
-0.024086* 
(-6.04) 
Trade openness 0.008587 
(0.55) 
-0.036895* 
(-6.81) 
Inflation 0.000666* 
(3.19) 
-0.000125** 
(-1.90) 
Corruption -0.001603* 
(-2.82) 
0.006956 
(2.24) 
Political stability -0.005839* 
(-2.59) 
-0.003195* 
(-2.66) 
Military in Politics -0.001603 
(-0.48) 
0.006539* 
(3.52) 
External conflicts -0.000365 
(-0.17) 
-0.002452*** 
(-1.74) 
R-Squared 0.799963 0.182510 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.749159 0.153951 
Note: The * indicates significant at 1%,** indicates significant at 5% and *** indicates 
significant at 10%.                                              
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Table 2. Hausman test for model specification (Random vs. Fixed) 
statistic P value 
 
0.000 
Note: P-value and are the probability value and Chi-square, respectively. 
 
To make sure the determinants of budget deficit and to make a comparison between 
results of panel data and time series analysis this study also makes an arrangement to 
study the source of budget deficit for individual country using time series data. First, 
the current study is using unit root to test stationarity of the model for four countries 
namely: Indonesia, Thailand, Pakistan and India. For the time series analysis the 
selection of countries depends on the availability of data for 1984 to 2016. We 
conclude that the series is stationary and we reject the null hypothesis of a unit root 
test if the ADF critical value is more than the ADF test statistic.  
 
Second step is to apply Ordinary Least Square estimates on the data set of countries 
under consideration. This may help to roughly compare the panel data and time 
series estimates to determine the sources of budget deficit. Table 3 presents the unit 
root test for Indonesia. It indicates that all variables found stationary at first 
difference except population. Population is stationary at second difference. Table 4 
presents the unit root test for Thailand. It indicates that all variables found stationary 
at first difference except population. Population is stationary at the initial level.  
 
For Pakistan the unit root test is presented in Table 5. It indicates that all variables 
found stationary at first difference except inflation. Inflation is stationary at second 
difference. Table 6 presents the unit root test for India. It indicates that entire 
explanatory variables found stationary at first difference except budget deficit and 
external conflicts. Both variables are stationary at the initial level. Since all variables 
are stationary and there is no problem of autocorrelation so the second step is to 
apply OLS (Ordinary Least Square estimates) to find out the determinants of budget 
deficit on the equation of selective countries depending on the availability of data set 
from 1984 to 2016. 
 
Table 3. Unit root test 
Indonesia 
Variables Level First difference Second difference 
Budget Deficit -2.10 -6.47**  
Gdp per capita 0.17 -3.77**  
Trade openness  -3.36*** -8.14**  
Inflation -1.70 -4.70**  
Population -2.08 -2.37 -3.50*** 
Corruption 1.79 -3.87**  
Political stability -2.53 -6.72**  
Military in Politics -0.67 -5.7-**  
External Conflicts -3.24*** -3.97**  
Note: *, ** and *** denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4. Unit root test  
Thailand 
Variables Level First difference Second difference 
Budget Deficit -2.57 -5.83**  
Gdp per capita 1.21 -4.74**  
Trade openness  -1.64 -5.96**  
Inflation -2.79 -5.05**  
Population -4.09**   
Corruption -1.44 -6.19**  
Political stability -1.84 -5.72**  
Military in Politics -0.62 -4.31**  
External Conflicts -0.82 -3.61**  
Note: *, ** and *** denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
  
Table 5. Unit root test 
Pakistan 
Variables Level First difference Second difference 
Budget Deficit -2.00 -5.79**  
Gdp per capita 1.50 -5.17**  
Trade openness  -2.98 -7.49**  
Inflation 3.05 -2.33 -4.37** 
Population 1.53 -5.52**  
Corruption -2.51 -5.64**  
Political stability -1.48 -5.10**  
Military in Politics -1.87 -4.42**  
External Conflicts -2.93 -4.90**  
Note: *, ** and *** denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Table 6. Unit root test 
India 
Variables Level First difference Second difference 
Budget Deficit -3.57**   
Gdp per capita 1.46 -0.007 -5.14** 
Trade openness  -3.09 -2.44 -1.91*** 
Inflation 1.35 -2.98 -6.30** 
Population 2.47 -4.61**  
Corruption -3.55*** -4.35**  
Political stability -1.99 -5.59**  
Military in Politics -2.72 -4.03**  
External Conflicts 3.72**   
Note: *, ** and *** denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
For the application of least square estimates to the equation of budget deficit this 
study has chosen four countries, namely, Indonesia, Thailand, Pakistan and India. 
The selection of countries was depended upon the availability of data set. Table 7 
presents the outcome of Ordinary Least Square estimates. The outcomes show that 
in the case of Indonesia only real GDP per capita has a significant and positive 
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association with budget deficit. It is also positive in the case of India but not 
significant. But in the case of Thailand and Pakistan real GDP per capita is 
negatively associated but it is significant only for Thailand.  Inflation has a robust 
effect on budget deficit in the case of all four countries. The outcome shows positive 
association of population with budget deficit in the case of Indonesia, Thailand and 
India but it has non-significant effect for Thailand only. For Pakistan population 
growth has negative and significant relationship with budget deficit.  Trade openness 
is a source of fiscal instability especially in Indonesia, Pakistan and India but it is not 
significant. It has negative and significant effect in the case of Thailand only. In 
current analysis to record the effect of political variables, political stability and 
corruption are included. Corruption is positively associated with budget deficit but it 
is significant only for Indonesia as shown in Table 7. Political stability is negatively 
and significantly associated only for Pakistan and India. The outcome of the current 
study indicates that budget is more stable with the higher political stability. Military 
in politics has also the expected sign only for Pakistan and India but their effect is 
significant only for India. An external conflict has the expected signs only for 
Thailand and it is significant as shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Ordinary Least Square estimates 
Dependent Variable 
 
Country Indonesia Thailand Pakistan  India 
Variables     
C -0.19** 
(-2.23) 
-0.09 
(-1.07) 
0.30 
(1.26) 
-0.29** 
(2.06) 
Gdp per capita 0.000000003** 
-(3.87) 
-0.000002** 
(-3.32) 
-0.000004 
(-1.49) 
0.000003 
(3.49) 
Population 0.036** 
(6.07) 
0.01 
(0.52) 
-0.15** 
(-3.61) 
0.14** 
(2.45) 
Trade openness 0.013 
(0.49) 
-0.26** 
(-5.25) 
0.10 
(0.25) 
0.03 
(0.87) 
Inflation 0.002*** 
(6.07) 
0.008** 
(4.74) 
0.004*** 
(1.37) 
0.003*** 
(3.48) 
Corruption -0.001** 
-(4.21) 
-0.02 
(-1.36) 
0.03*** 
(1.63) 
-0.002 
(-0.58) 
Political stability 0.0019 
(0.92) 
0.003 
(0.74) 
-0.0** 
(-2.30) 
(-0.002)*** 
(-1.65) 
Military in Politics 0,010*** 
(1.76) 
0.007 
(0.65) 
-0.01 
(-0.46) 
-0.007*** 
(-1.48) 
External conflicts 0.003 
(0.90) 
-0.01** 
(-2.61) 
0.005 
(0.75) 
0.002 
(1.09) 
R-Squared 0.94 0.80 0.83 0.46 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.93 0.74 0.77 0.28 
Note: The * indicates significant at 1%,** indicates significant at 5% and *** indicates 
significant at 10%. 
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The current study has a major objective to examine not only economic determinants 
of budget deficit but also to focus on political variables as well for South Asia and 
ASEAN region for 1984 to 2016. The determinants of budget deficit instability are 
estimated by application of panel data and time series models. For the application of 
panel data fixed effect and random effect models are used. Hausman test statistic is 
used to make a decision about the best fit model for the current study. The fixed 
effect model is the best fit model according to the result of Hausman test statistic.  
 
The outcome of fixed effect explain that all variables has expected signs but effect of 
military in politics and external conflicts are not significant for South Asia and 
ASEAN region. The results of fixed effect show that inflation and real GDP per 
capita holds a robust effect on budget deficit. The results show that the budget 
deficit volatility and population growth has negative association. This result may be 
due to the benefits of increasing return to scale as it is possible for the government to 
provide more welfare projects as there is a large group of tax payers as the 
population growth increases. In the present analysis trade openness has shown a 
positive relationship with budget deficit. This may be due to the fact of rise in the 
import prices of the sample countries.  
 
The current study matches the results of panel data and time series analysis and 
concludes that corruption and political stability are important indicators of budget 
deficit. According to present study institutional variables are also very important 
determinants of budget deficit. The outcome indicates that the budget is more stable 
with the higher level of political stability. The Budget deficit has more fluctuations if 
higher level of corruption coexists. Military in politics & conflicts has also expected 
sign but their effect is not significant. 
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